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INTERVIEW
The world in axioms: an interview with Patrick Suppes
Catherine Herfeld*
Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy
5(Received 30 October 2015; accepted 19 January 2016)
I met Patrick Suppes on 18 March 2014 in his ofﬁce at the Stanford’s Center for Study
of Language and Information. Until his passing away in November of that same year,
he was still actively engaged in research at the Suppes Brain Research Lab, a labora-
10tory that he had founded in the 1990s and where he investigated questions around lan-
guage and human cognition. We had arranged the interview long before our meeting,
but when he entered the center, it became clear how busy he still was: responsibilities
from various sides before the interview; phone calls and signature requests in between
the interview. He had already reached the age of 92, but seemed more energetic than
15many colleagues half a century younger. This energy was also what struck me during
the interview. I had probably not met somebody as broadly literate and eloquently artic-
ulated as Suppes before. That itself might not mean much. And it conﬁrmed in a way
what I had repeatedly read and heard about him from his former colleagues and his
admirers who had interacted with and had followed him throughout his career. But
20what means much, I think, is that I was able to conﬁrm this observation when he had
reached his 90s.
Patrick Suppes had received his B.S. in meteorology at the University of Chicago
in 1943 and his Ph.D. in philosophy at Columbia University under the supervision of
Ernest Nagel in 1950. In that same year, he was appointed assistant and subsequently
25associate professor of philosophy at Stanford University, where he ﬁrst came into con-
text with Tarski’s logic and set-theoretical models. In 1959, Suppes was appointed pro-
fessor for philosophy as well as director of the Institute for Mathematical Studies in
the Social Sciences at Stanford University. He had stayed at Stanford ever since, and
he never really retired.
30I conducted the interview for a book project entitled Conversations on Rational
Choice Theory, which aims at bringing together the views of scholars who were and
still are engaged with developing and applying various approaches of rational decision-
making within and beyond economics. An interview with Suppes was a natural choice
for such a project and for multiple reasons. One reason was that throughout his life,
35Suppes had been one of the strongest defenders of the axiomatic method in his work, a
major ingredient of modern theories of rational choice. He had been deeply involved in
working on the foundations of psychology and was one of the pioneers in using formal
mathematical tools to approach human decision-making when they had been introduced
in the 1950s and 1960s into the social and behavioral sciences. Beyond that, Suppes
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5 had worked on problems concerning the foundations of physics, on the theory of mea-
surement, the measurement of utility and subjective probability in uncertain situations,
and on learning theory. His research covered topics in philosophy of science, such as
on problems around causation. And he made pioneering contributions to computerized
learning, the development and testing of general learning theory, and the semantics and
10 syntax of natural language in philosophy of language. As such, he was a polymath,
and as such, he will always be remembered.
Catherine Herfeld: Professor Suppes, what do you take rational choice theory to
be?
Patrick Suppes: It is an axiomatic theory of choice yet it could also be non-axiomatic.
15 But I think the axiomatic theory plays a particular role in isolating things in cases
where it is hopeless to verbally theorize about without contradiction. So I think it
should be done axiomatically, if one can. At the same time, I think that although it is
as such a highly mathematical theory, we see the right continued development of it in
recent years. It has become an ever-richer empirical subject, in terms of bringing in
20 additional concepts.
C: What do you think it is that makes it a theory of rational choice? Is it the set
of rationality axioms?
S: Making a theory of rationality can be done axiomatically but does not have to. How-
ever, despite the development towards a more empirical theory, I ultimately think that
25 the right way to do it is axiomatically, if one can. I think the axiomatic theory plays a
particular role in isolating things, where it is said that it is hopeless to theorize, where
we encounter contradictions.
C: What makes rational choice theory to be a theory of rational choice?
S: I am very wary of the use of the word rational. I talk about choice theory. Delete
30 rational!
C: How did you become interested in choice theories?
S: I worked very closely with David Blackwell and Meyer Girshick. Herman Rubin
and I studied their book The Theory of Games and Statistical Decisions very carefully.
That was an inﬂuential book on theory of games and decisions. And it was really
35 important for me.
C: And how did you ﬁrst get into contact with the axiomatic method?
I think I had two forces in my life at work that inﬂuenced my axiomatic view. One
was working on the book by Blackwell and Girshick in particular. The other was
Alfred Tarski, with whom I became acquainted in Berkeley and during the time I stud-
40 ied game theory. So I met Tarski, but that was also because J.C.C. McKenzie was here.
He must have been on the order of 10 or 12 years older than me. And he knew Tarski
from back in the 1930s and so, on account of him, I met Tarski. We had very close
interaction with Berkeley, with a lot of the Berkeley students, and they had a com-
pletely axiomatic view of the world was the dominant, foundationally at that time.
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5C: You mention in your autobiography that you were organizing an informal sem-
inar already during your graduate studies in philosophy at Columbia University
where you discussed the Theory of Games and Economic Decisions by John von
Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern. How come that you were already interested in
game theory before you came to Stanford University?
10S: Yes, in 1947–1948 we read the theory of games with some graduate students. My
advisor in philosophy was Ernest Nagel. My history is complicated because of interrup-
tions due to the war. My interests had been originally in physics, and so I came to phi-
losophy only after the war on the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act, i.e. G.I. Bill of
rights. I continued to work while the government supported me as a graduate student
15in philosophy. At Ernest’s encouragement, I took both graduate courses in physics and
mathematics, and from both of the directions, particularly the mathematics, as far as
axiomatics goes, there was somebody who was quite prominent, Samuel Eilenberg. He
was a Polish mathematician, a topologist, who exempliﬁed a very abstract view. He
gave beautiful lectures on group theory, which were very abstract, though, much to the
20disgust of the physicists, who expected from group theory something more practical
from their standpoint. That was in 1947 and 1948.
C: Back then, the axiomatic method was important mostly in mathematics and
physics. What did you, as a philosopher, expect from the axiomatic method at that
time?
25S: I became interested in it during a time when contemporary mathematics was just
making a transition to a more or less full adoption of a set-theoretical axiomatic view-
point about mathematics and so there is a lot conceptual lens throwing in and old-fash-
ioned analysts did not like it. When I came to Stanford for example in 1950, we had
some superb European analysts who were refugees. They were trained mathematicians
30of an older generation. They had been raised on analysis, according to which there was
only one real system for them. They did not think of it axiomatically. Real and com-
plex analysis, this was the truth for them. And they were remarkable. They did beauti-
ful work, but without an emphasis on axiomatics. The point is that it was complicated.
At the same time, there was this corresponding movement in the United States that was
35really emphasized by a number of people, and I got early support on account of it, to
emphasize people with mathematical background to work in the social sciences and
behavioral sciences. And, for various reasons, a lot of our work was axiomatic in char-
acter.
C: What were the reasons for taking this focus?
40S: That is a good question. This was in the late 1940s and early 1950s. I think it
reﬂected the fact that, preceding that, there had been this big turn to axiomatic methods
in mathematics itself. If you had looked at mathematics in America before or during
the war in, say 1937, this would not have been that way. Mathematics itself was not
done so axiomatically. So the transition had been happening in mathematics. It was
45accelerated by people like Eilenberg and other scholars at Columbia, but particularly
Eilenberg. He was a great inﬂuence there. And that sort of spilled. That’s surely some
off the cuff insights into this history that are probably correct. Ken Arrow was involved
in this early history before I was.
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C: The axiomatic method eventually became adopted in psychology and the social
5 sciences. This is interesting because initially it did not naturally lend itself to
address many of the core problems in those disciplines. But around the 1950s,
scholars from various disciplines – not only in economics but also in psychology
and philosophy – started to use the axiomatic method.
S: That is true. A lot of people did not like it. But then Ken Arrow’s dissertation had
10 some examples of showing the use of the axiomatic method in economics, showing
negatively to how certain things are impossible. I think similar things happened in the
theory of preference, maybe related to what Arrow did but now focused on the individ-
ual. And there was a lot of dispute about subjective probability and about utility theory.
Such disputes – similar to much earlier disputes like Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory – are
15 responses to what seemed to be contradictions. In other words, the use of axiomatics is
inspired by contradictions.
The axiomatic method has this old tradition. It was probably really ﬁrst introduced
in an important mathematical way by the ancient Greeks. The ancient Greeks were
responding to the very ﬁrst problem. More precisely, there were two problems together,
20 namely that the square root of 2 and pi are rational numbers. And there was huge dis-
pute about this in the fourth or ﬁfth century B.C. It is really in Greek mathematics
where the axiomatic method did begin. It was so unbelievably sophisticated already
then. There was nothing corresponding to this mathematical sophistication of the
Greeks. Remember the problem was to prove consistency, so you had already both the
25 axioms and the problem of consistency.
So, to see the origins of these problems, you have to look into the past. In the case
of set theory, it goes back to Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. In 1900, David Hilbert, at
the international congress of mathematics, gave a list of famous open problems. Prob-
lem number one was to prove the continuum hypothesis. And of course he believed it
30 could be proved. After the earlier work from Ernst Zermelo and Abraham Fraenkel,
including Kurt Gödel’s work, the most striking piece of work, was Paul Cohen’s proof
of the independence of the axiom of choice from Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the
axiom of choice. What that showed was, in some sense, the limitations of our thinking
about what should be the foundations of mathematics. It showed that it is not just rou-
35 tine but rather that once we have done that, then there are real problems with how to
think about what is the total foundation.
C: Together with Kurt Gödel’s two incompleteness theorems and also John von
Neumann’s confrontation with the limitations of axiomatization in mathematics,
this history did not necessarily make the axiomatic method attractive. Why did
40 scholars begin to use the axiomatic method extensively in the social sciences?
S: Well, you have to remember something else. We had these results but historically,
scholars had made this huge effort in others parts of science, but especially mathemat-
ics, to provide an axiomatic foundation. This urge, generated way back with the
Greeks, came from the belief that the proper way to do things in mathematics and the
45 sciences was in that way. Ptolemy’s astronomy, written in about 100 AD is in some
sense a more rigorous book about astronomy, including observations, than a lot of work
that came much later by astronomers in the twentieth-century.
Ptolemy had written in this very rigorous, Euclidean fashion. And you see they also
have a problem, like the continuum hypothesis. Ptolemy’s astronomy was based upon
4 C. Herfeld
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5the hypothesis, starting with Eudoxos, that all the orbits are circular, or compositions of
circles. They discovered quite early that simple circles would not work and that you
needed the composition of circles. Yet, these circles had a very strong restriction as part
of their classical theory of axiomatic foundations of astronomy. The angular velocity
must be constant, of the rotation of the Earth. They found already in Ptolemy’s time
10that this would not work, unless you had many more convolutions of circles, which
they did not want. So they would add either epicycles or epicenters. An epicycle is
where you have an orbit and now you introduce a small [perturbation of an] orbit on
the circumference. An epicenter is where you dislocate the center, which was a very
big move, from being at the center of the Earth. So epicenter was to move the center
15off in order to ﬁt the trajectory of a particular planet.
Now of course it was Apoloneus who proved the equivalence of these two mathe-
matically, which is quite surprising. They have many different mathematical descrip-
tions. Any orbit that had an epicenter representation had also an epicycle and
conversely. So already there you see that it was considered very important to under-
20stand, starting from a very clear axiomatic basis, how the universe was working. And
the impulse to that came out of this Greek tradition. It did not exist in Babylonia. The
Babylonians were very good at computing, but at least all the stone tablets that we
have read so far do not show anything comparable at all to Greek thought in this axio-
matic way.
25I think this history is very important to understand this history of axiomatics. And
what is interesting is that it was not just pure mathematics. The application of mathematics
to the motion of the heavens was the most successful empirical example in the ancient
world. There were other good examples; some work in mechanics for example by people
like for example Archimedes. But that was above all the most striking example.
30C: So was the use of the axiomatic method primarily an attempt to make the
social sciences more scientiﬁc in the 1950s?
S: Sure, absolutely. But I think that there was another impulse, which had been the
same one that dominated Greek early thought, namely to address these paradoxes that
we were talking about. Some of those paradoxes have a long history, like for example
35the gambler’s fallacy. So, there has also been a long history regarding the work on
decision-making and betting. And particularly here, axiomatization was an attempt to
get rid of those paradoxes. One basic impulse is, when you have a paradox that seems
to give you a contradiction in your intuitive way of thinking, try to axiomatize what
you think the true theory is. Because a true theory that is consistent cannot have para-
40doxes.
C: Axiomatization seems to have had a different effect in the behavioral and social
sciences. Take the kind of paradoxes that Leonard Savage encountered in the
early 1950’s with the axioms of his subjective expected utility theory or the Allais
paradox. Those examples seem to be different from those you have in mind
45because they were provoked from the empirical weakness of those axioms. Savage
himself failed to conform to his axioms.
S: And he then felt the axioms needed modiﬁcation.
C: Those paradoxes did not arise from internal inconsistency of the system but
rather from failing to conform to empirical evidence. And one response of Savage
Journal of Economic Methodology 5
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5 to Maurice Allais was that indeed those axioms were not useful for empirical, but
only for normative purposes.
S: Well of course that is a different kind of response. And Savage wrote his book in
1954. That was in the early days. The literature became huge on this, particularly in
economics and in psychology. Even today, there is a new discussion. And one attempt
10 of a new discussion was to try to eliminate problems by giving an appropriate axio-
matic foundation. In many of the cases, consistency is much more a problem in the
minds of mathematicians than it is of economists. But although Savage just reinter-
preted his theory, there was still some concern to show that theories were consistent.
C: That’s true. Arrow’s proof of inconsistency was, according to Arrow himself, a
15 reason for why his dissertation was very much regarded in some areas of eco-
nomics as something profound.
S: I think people also realized that there was a huge amount of cluttered normative
thinking. And one of the ways to show that this does not all ﬁt together well is to show
that they are inconsistent, and then the question is what kind of positive consistent the-
20 ory can you construct, and the natural way of doing that is to think axiomatically. That
is, the axiomatic method is a natural response to the existence of inconsistencies in
intuitive thinking. I think that is an important idea. Do you agree with that or not?
C: One would probably agree with that if committed to a particular image of
science
25 S: This is theoretical thinking about science. Maybe this thinking can be also empirical
because empirical data are also used to show that classical theories do not work.
C: What is the usefulness of mathematics in science beyond guaranteeing the con-
sistency of the theories?
S: Mathematics, and also statistics, is most useful when it can also be used for predic-
30 tive purposes. You see the history of axiomatics in mathematics turned out to be much
more convoluted than it had been thought. The results of Gödel and Cohen and other
people show that you cannot prove consistency unless using a theory that is more pow-
erful. You could not prove ordinary mathematics, let’s say classical analysis, as being
consistent without using a theory that was still more powerful, and whose proof of con-
35 sistency was even harder than the theory you’re using it to prove. But you could not
prove with a system of the same strength that it was consistent. That’s a great result.
C: Isn’t Arrow’s impossibility theorem a striking result?
S: That is a much more specialized theorem. I mean big time theorems in mathematics
as a whole. But, yes, it is an important result.
40 C: Apart from the fact that it allows for guaranteeing the consistency of the sys-
tem, what do you consider the empirical usefulness of such a theoretical undertak-
ing?
S: It takes some of the wind out of the sails of overblown theories, and you cut theory
back to having a more empirical character. For example, if you want to be very ﬁnitis-
45 tic, you can prove consistency. Something you can do is to discuss the consistency of
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arithmetic, if you consider no number larger than some ﬁxed natural number. There
was a discussion about these aspects, about ﬁnitistic theories of utility, in the 1950’s.
The problem with Savage’s book of 1954 was that he used inﬁnite sets of states, etc.
which clashes with the real world. It was written in a speciﬁc way, in a kind of classi-
5cal mathematical style. One kind of response was that we can be ﬁnitistic about this.
Now, I think economics has not stayed that way in general at all. In fact it is very unu-
sual to have highly constructive ﬁnitistic theories in economics. They have gone back
to depending mainly on classical analysis.
C: Recently economists have made new attempts to improve economic theories of
10behavior by taking psychological and neuroscientiﬁc results more seriously.
S: Sure, and that’s the direction of complexity.
C: One hope might also be that psychological theories could replace axiomatic
foundations at some point.
S: Well I think the following point isn’t always made explicit and it has its own weak-
15nesses, but if you make everything sufﬁciently ﬁnitistic, then, in principle, you can just
give that. Axiomatics can be given in a kind of clear but uninteresting way. So you
have a ﬁnite set of axioms; the models are all ﬁnite. But, some of those models will
lead to very complicated sets of axioms. And of course what people want is something
that is more reduced than that. So what may happen, if you abandon trying to give rel-
20atively simple axiomatic theories, is that the theory now no longer has a clear formula-
tion. Much of economics is still that way. All you have to do is turn on the TV to see
and to listen to amateur economics discussed endlessly. And so what happens is that
you no longer have a budding science; you have something much weaker.
C: But does this not also depend on how axioms are justiﬁed? Your own work in
25psychology for example is highly formal in parts, yet it was signiﬁcantly inspired
by your empirical work.
S: Yes! Because my thrust was to get at what really the basic assumptions are in each
case, in order to clarify what follows from them. Many of the people in psychology
who wrote the theories didn’t know any mathematics or very little.
30C: Did economists just get it wrong with their axiom systems so far? Should they
have taken other sets of axioms, axioms that are more empirically inspired?
S: Remember you have something going on in economics that isn’t mentioned enough
on this side of discussion, and that is econometrics. So there was a strong statistical
econometric tradition going back into the nineteenth-century, at least. And there was
35not a strong interaction between these two. I do not think that econometrics is men-
tioned once in Savage’s book, for example.
In the neoclassical tradition of economics, there are so many theoretical papers that
don’t come even close to data of any kind. And that’s very important, because I think
that the big difference between economists and psychologists is that while economists
40are better theoreticians, psychologists are much better at having found good data to try
to support theories. In Kenneth Arrow’s thesis, for example, there is almost no ﬂow of
experiments that directly follow from that work. What ﬂows from it is a body of theo-
retical work.
Journal of Economic Methodology 7
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C: At which level could data enter the picture in such a theoretical framework?
5 S: What actually happened in physics is a good example. Newton’s work was not
purely theoretical. Rather, there was a continual interaction between theoretical and
empirical work, i.e. between the data and the correct estimation of the parameters in
the theory. That is the glory of celestial mechanics; in the eighteenth-century, particu-
larly at the end of the 17th, it was recognized that you had this very powerful interac-
10 tion between theory and data. It wasn’t even about experiments because what they used
was astronomical data. But, sure that doesn’t really occur too often.
C: Some economists tried when they considered classical mechanics as their role
model for a very long time and considered utility theory as a useful starting point
for economic theorizing as it approximated human behavior in the market sphere.
15 S: But name an economist who was serious about that. They weren’t serious about it.
That’s one thing that’s very hard work.
C: William Stanley Jevons or Vilfredo Pareto?
S: Well Jevons and Pareto were too late. I’m talking about the earlier period. Newton’s
famous papers on this were written at the end of the seventeenth-century, and they had
20 a big impact on scientiﬁc work in the eighteenth-century.
C: Economics is a much younger science than physics. What some economists
tried was looking at the successful theories in physics and then formulating an
analogous theoretical, deductive framework. They believed that they might be able
to arrive at a theory that could be based on a small set of behavioral laws that
25 could ultimately be formulated in mathematical terms.
S: I think it is nonsense. It is really romantic nonsense.
C: Formulating a general theory of human behavior and social interaction seems
to be just a huge challenge …
S: It is the same challenge in physics. I remember a famous lecture I heard in the late
30 1940s or early 1950s by a prominent mathematical physicist. He said: we owe our stu-
dents an apology. We have taught them as if physics is really simple, when in fact, we
as physicists can only solve the simplest cases completely. So I like to say that celestial
mechanics is really a great science, for n = 1 it’s ﬁne, for n = 2 you can do very well,
but go to n = 3 particles, and you’re stuck. The behavior you cannot give a complete
35 account of. And that isn’t very far into it. And if you go to relativistic mechanics, clas-
sical mechanics now formulated for relativistic purposes, n = 2 is not solvable in closed
form, so it’s only n = 1. Quantum mechanics is completely weak in studying the inter-
action of atoms or particles or whatever it may be.
C: In your autobiography, you state that your knowledge of meteorology had
40 stood you “in good stead throughout the years in refuting arguments that attempt
to draw some sharp distinction between the precision and perfection of the physi-
cal sciences and the vagueness and imprecision of the social sciences. Meteorology
is in theory a part of physics, but in practice more like economies, especially in
the handling of a vast ﬂow of nonexperimental data.” This sounds very much like
8 C. Herfeld
RJEC 1189126 CE: SR QA: PK
19 May 2016 Initial
5what Kenneth Arrow said, when talking about his disappointments with physics
and its inexactness as a science when he worked as a meteorologist. You were both
saying that you were disappointed by physics, because it turned out that physics is
not the exact science that you thought it was. If neither physics nor economics
have achieved to be exact sciences, what does that imply – conceptually and
10methodologically – for how those sciences should be practices?
S: Yes, Ken and I discuss that regularly, we were both meteorologists in World War II.
My view that I’ve come to gradually late in life, is that science is mainly extremely
fragmentary in character as opposed to the idea of it being a well-organized thorough
body of knowledge that explains to us mainly how the universe works. Like
15experience, it is very fragmentary. The cases can be studied thoroughly are extremely
limited.
C: Some people might argue that this would go against one of the most important
motivations for axiomatics.
S: No, not at all. At least what you’ve got you can study axiomatically. What you
20haven’t got, you can’t study at all. In that sense, axiomatics helped clarify. Only if you
start with a very clear basis you can come to see that the situation is in fact hopeless.
If you don’t have a strong ﬁrm basis, people can think mistakenly. If we think of the
right function here, we’re going to be able to get our way through this. Whereas start-
ing from a clear axiomatic basis, to prove incompleteness or insolubility, or the impos-
25sibility of a closed form solution to a differential equation, is a great triumph of the
human intellect, to understand that the world is complicated. And only if you had a
good foundation do you believe those proofs being correct. I mean that’s probably one
of the best examples, that very familiar differential equations, both ordinary and partial,
do not have closed form solutions.
30C: That is interesting, because for example your work on the foundations of mea-
surement was an attempt of trying to lay the foundations of measurement for all
the sciences.
S: My own view changed; my earlier views, when I was younger, were wrong. When
one is younger, one is too naïve. I was, and most people are, too naïve about the possi-
35bility of having genuine wide-ranging semi-complete solutions to things. That is much
too optimistic. And it has taken a long time to realize the fact that what we can do with
mathematics about natural phenomena is much more limited than was originally
thought. Meteorology is a good help to see that. Everybody talks about the weather but
nobody can thoroughly understand it scientiﬁcally in terms of what you would like to
40have. You would like being able to predict the weather two weeks from now. That is
an insight that has come late to me.
C: In your work in the 1950’s with Donald Davidson and Sidney Siegel you did
experiments where you showed that the results of expected utility theory were not
that satisfying.
45S: We already showed that in these ﬁnitistic cases, it didn’t work out the way you
liked.
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C: Did this already lead you to doubts about a science of rationality?
S: Absolutely. This was in the special case for rationality. But now I am talking about
a wider generalization of mine, that this intuitive science in general is fragmentary in
5 character. Almost no problem of any complexity can be solved completely in science.
And we have illusions of grandeur as to what we can do theoretically.
C: Was this early work driven by the general idea that we can ﬁnd the general
axioms of the social sciences?
S: It was a mistake to think we’re going to do that, ﬁnding general axioms of the social
10 sciences. The discussions of Savage and others turned out to be dominated by a very
naïve view about human behavior. And I think some of the things that I probably wrote
then, I would now consider naïve, even though I was already on the side of the posi-
tion that it is hard to solve things, hard to ﬁnd cases where utility theory really works.
C: One could argue also that this kind of work has nevertheless certain usefulness.
15 First, it appears to be very challenging in general to ﬁnd a general theory of
human behavior and utility theory had some speciﬁc features that were useful at
least for modeling purposes. Second, its usefulness might also depend on the prob-
lem at hand, which varies across disciplines. The theory might suit for one pur-
pose better than for another.
20 S: Well measurement was one thing. I think theoretically I would consider my work
on stochastic learning models as more important in psychology. But certainly mea-
surement has been important in psychology. It had its important place in economics
as part of a general discussion. I am in my reﬂective later years now and I can say
that. But already back then, I think Duncan Luce pushed us more in the direction of
25 mathematics and the foundations of measurement than I thought was a good idea. I
can remember our discussion about those issues and about how they should be han-
dled. I thought we should deal more with ﬁnitistic examples, the statistics of real
measurement and I can remember Dave Krantz saying that the trouble would be that
it would going to be too hard to do thoroughly. My own criticism of the foundations
30 of measurement was that too much time was spent on what I would consider as
being not very interesting, reasonably elementary, mathematics. It would have been
much better to have given a much more thorough treatment of ﬁnite models with
error, and to have analyzed the theory of error, the statistics of error very thoroughly
because this was something psychologists themselves did not and don’t know and
35 understand too well. Yet, we didn’t lead the way we should’ve, that’s my personal
view. Upon reﬂection, this is my criticism of that work in which I partly joined in
and as such it is criticism of myself.
C: What did you think of axiomatic work in economics such as Gerard Debreu’s
Theory of Value?
40 S: I have the same criticism of Debreu, and I knew him quite well. He never really
applied a theory in detail to any complicated data.
C: Why do you think economists have not been as much concerned about apply-
ing their theories to complicated data as they were with developing complicated
theories?
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5S: I think that this is an interesting historical question. Why have there been these two
rather separate traditions in economics? What is interesting about it is that the people
who have been interested in data are often quite sophisticated mathematically, because
they have a background in mathematical statistics. That’s good but it’s a different back-
ground, you know. The development of the theory of mathematical statistics took place
10in the 1940s and 1950s. Many of those people, Kenneth Arrow for example with lots
of mathematical background, were also working in economics, I mean, for example,
the whole theory of IID random variables, and the asymptotic theory of that, which has
its own application, it’s also beautiful mathematically, but that was really something
very different than, say, neo-classical theory.
15For us, an important book such as for example J.L. Doob’s book Stochastic Pro-
cesses was only published in the 1950’s. One of the things we wanted to understand
was the clariﬁcation of probability, and we were not so much concerned with statistics.
Initially, the Russians had best done this. Take Andrei Kolomogorov’s famous work in
German, which had been published earlier in Russian, was only 1933. We were very
20late, and the Russians were determined to show that probability was very much a,
should be a standard mathematical theory. So there’s no question, you see, that the
Russians were numero uno in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth-century in probability the-
ory. There were good people elsewhere, but the Russians dominated the results. And
what they were showing, that there was a strong mathematical theory required to solve
25standard conceptual problems in probability theory.
Too many people ignore the Russians. The Russian tradition was not really statisti-
cal, but it was probability all the way down. They were late to really digging fully into
modern statistical procedure, with the random variable set up, and data, etc. that is, that
whole modern set up of mathematical statistics. And yet they proved the largest body
30of important theorems. The largest body was clearly proved by the Russians, starting
with Alexandre Lyapunov and that is all written down in Andrey’s Kolmogorov’s work.
And their work is also an interesting example of axiomatic theory. Kolmogorov is very
clear about being axiomatic. He says it’s like Hilbert’s axioms, which he was wrong
there. Because he doesn’t start with qualitative axioms and derive a quantitative repre-
35sentation, but clearly it is axiomatically written, and he’s very clear about writing it that
way. And that was a clarifying thing already in 1933, which is pretty early in this story,
that’s like roughly 23 years before Kenneth Arrow’s dissertation was published. It took
two decades. And that was a very important inﬂuence in probability theory.
I mention probability theory for an important reason because it been so important
40in the social and behavioral sciences as a mathematical apparatus. But the ﬁrm founda-
tions of probability theory don’t date much before 1933. Laplace had done interesting
work and Abraham De Moivre but really getting the foundations straight, axiomatically,
came quite late, which is an interesting story in itself.
C: In economics, there was J.M. Keynes wrote a treatise on probability …
45S: Yes, but it is terrible. It’s a mess. It’s particularly a mess, given when it was written
and given that the Russian had done before. And on the scientiﬁc side, Keynes’s book
on probability never had a big impact, and rightly so.
C: What makes an axiomatic theory a good theory?
S: I think Isaac Newton’s work was good. Newton really clariﬁed in some deep way
50how to think about the foundations of mechanics, which was not so clearly done
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before. That doesn’t mean there aren’t predecessors. But Newton was the one who
really crystallized it. And what’s important about this is that he wasn’t just crystallizing
the foundations, but he was doing something important with it, namely to develop an
axiomatic theory of gravitational interaction, that is, the most pervasive and important
5 and mystifying approach of gravity. We still don’t quite know how we want to explain
gravity, but we certainly know that gravity is there. And Newton said he had no place
for hypotheses. He clariﬁed, without explaining it in some philosophical way, what is
gravity. He clariﬁed what the laws are, the primary law, of attraction. And that was a
very important clariﬁcation. Descartes’ theory of gravitation for example was hopeless.
10 It was a ﬁeld theory, so there wouldn’t be action at a distance, but of course it was
physically wrong and it was shown decisively so by Newton and others. Two genera-
tions after Newton they were still using Descartes in the introductory course of physics
at Cambridge University. So the world moves slowly.
C: Was the work of von Neumann and Morgenstern on formulating a theory of
15 human interaction comparable in its signiﬁcance for the social sciences?
S: Some people think that and I think actually, in the terms of the methodological
effect it has had, there is some sense that John von Neumann’s big treatise on the the-
ory of games had a big impact, in introducing a way of thinking formally about multi-
person interactions.
20 C: In your paper General Remarks on the Study of Preference, you argue that
human behavior is hugely complex, which limits the empirical value of any simple
and general psychological theory of decision-making. At the same time, you criti-
cize the heavy focus in economics on optimization, which – one could argue –
comes however with the beneﬁt of being able to use sophisticated mathematics to
25 formulate economic problems in a precise manner. How do you think should the
trade off between an empirically more adequate and useful theory of human
behavior and a simple mathematical theory be made?
S: I think, of course, that the empirical side wins that battle. The world is not going to
change in some drastic way to satisfy some simple theory of optimization. So, you’re
30 not going to change the world. Rather, you have to change your theory.
C: Scientists almost always have to idealize …
S: Not necessarily. Not when it’s going to lead you in a lot of bad predictions. If my
job in the world were to be an opponent – which it’s not – of neo-classical economics,
I’d rub their nose in the fact that they are not able to predict anything correctly. Every-
35 thing is different from what they say it is. So why should we take seriously their ideas?
And they would have to respond to that.
C: The subject of economics, namely the economy, seems to be very similar to the
subject of the meteorologist, namely the weather. Would it be better to acknowl-
edge that we cannot predict very well the weather two weeks in advance and con-
40 sider rethinking the idea of having an axiomatic theory all together?
S: One of the things about economics today is that you need proofs of chaotic behav-
ior, because the basic equations are chaotic. And that’s not necessarily true of all the
equations of neo-classical economics. The equations in those theories are not chaotic,
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and that’s what’s wrong with the example. You might ask what the problem is in
5understanding the elementary processes in the weather. How could the predictions be
so bad? The answer is that the theory is chaotic. There’s no hope of having extended
predictions from it. That’s the nature of chaotic systems. One typical feature is that they
are so unbelievably sensitive to initial conditions. Another example from physics is tur-
bulence. Turbulence gets generated in the process of things occurring that are them-
10selves unpredictable. But none of that’s discussed at all in economics.
C: So, do you think that this should be the direction in which a science like eco-
nomics should be going?
S: Absolutely. Take for example something like modern ﬁnance. Modern ﬁnance is just
full of unbelievably complex instruments. None of those instruments are discussed at
15carefully in the theory in this broad neo-classical tradition.
C: There are some attempts in econophysics that try to push in this direction …
S: Right, and that’s a good idea. That is the direction to go.
C: Would this imply a shift in focus away from studying individual decision-mak-
ing with the aid of simple experiments towards studying the behavior of a complex
20system?
S: I think there’s the following correct moral idea of what you’re saying. We don’t
really do experiments in meteorology that are very successful and useful. We think
there have been experiments that are useful, but we don’t feel the need for that,
because it is evident that this doesn’t compare to how to deal with the chaotic behavior
25of the systems that are approximately correct. But that is in fact the real problem.
C: Should economists then still depart from an axiomatic representation of human
behavior?
S: In meteorology, we start with continuous equations. But those equations describe
behavior of continuous ﬂuids that are, by assumption, considered continuous for mathe-
30matical approximation. For the purposes of the weather, they can be treated as such
even though we all know they’re not, in a mathematical sense, continuous. So whether
economists should start with equations that describe the behavior of human agents is a
question of what’s going to work, not necessarily about how far to go in the reduction.
The approximation of continuity in that assumption is not bad, if all you look at is the
35study of the ﬂow of the saturation of water and the water vapor in the atmosphere.
Studying it as a continuous process, that aspect of approximation is not where the prob-
lems are. It’s not those approximations that are the source of the problem, almost
surely. Rather, the source is that large-scale systems that are chaotic.
C: So how important do you consider the current work in psychology and behav-
40ioral economics?
S: Social psychologists, for example, don’t even know what a chaotic system is, at least
most of them.
Whether the claim that you can show that economic systems are chaotic is true of
an economic system is a nice question. And it is a long way from the current mathe-
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5 matical investigations. It took quite sophisticated theoretical investigation to prove that
the weather system is, to ﬁrst approximation, chaotic. Economists should give it a try.
By the way, in this context I should remark that Edward Norton Lorenz should be
regarded as the most famous meteorologist of the twentieth-century. He really proved
these things most successfully. He was my fellow predictor in Guam of bombing of
10 Tokyo, he and I prepared the predictions for the winds over 10,000 feet every day.
12 h on, 12 h off, in the last months of World War II. And the largest American air
base by far, for bombing Tokyo, in Guam, Saipan, and another third island. Headquar-
ters were in Guam, when I was in the weather central for the 20th air force. We
bombed Tokyo every day. People don’t realize, that we killed more people in Tokyo
15 than we killed with the atomic bomb. Another year and we’d have destroyed Tokyo.
Every day he and I had the responsibility to predict the weather, and particularly the
upper air winds, the planes were coming in at 20,000 feet, what were going to be the
dominant winds. If you predicted a B29 to come in on the wrong way, the winds were
strong enough that the plane almost was stationary over Tokyo for too long, to be hit
20 by anti-aircraft. You had to bring them in a way they got out of there fast. But that is
only a side note.
C: So, mathematics should be the central ingredient of economic theories?
S: Of course! Nobody is going to have a serious theory about anything that is compli-
cated that does not use mathematics. They may think so, but they are just kidding
25 themselves. And you have people who are deceived about that. They think that they
can verbalize some really complicated phenomena successfully. We have had a bunch
of experimental psychologists in history who felt that way. Well, I have to say that they
are wrong!
C: Are you after truth?
30 S: Yes, I’m all for truth. It’s just hard to achieve – its fragmentary.
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